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THE LABYRINTH OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM
NADER EL-BIZRI

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the methodological issues related to the obstacles
and potential horizons of approaching the philosophical traditions in Islam from the
standpoint of comparative studies in philosophy, while also presenting selected casestudies that may potentially illustrate some of the possibilities of renewing the impetus of
a philosophical thought that is inspired by Islamic intellectual history. This line of inquiry
is divided into two parts: the first deals with questions of methodology, and the second
focuses on ontology and phenomenology of perception, by way of offering pathways in
investigating the history of philosophical and scientific ideas in Islam from the viewpoint
of contemporary debates in philosophy. A special emphasis will be placed on: (a)
interpreting the ontology of the eleventh century metaphysician Ibn Sīnā (known in Latin
as: Avicenna; d. 1037 CE) in terms of rethinking Heidegger’s critique of the history of
metaphysics, and (b) analyzing the philosophical implications of the theory of vision of
the eleventh century polymath Ibn al-Haytham (known in Latin as Alhazen; d. ca. 1041
CE) in terms of reflecting on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception.
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PART I
1. LINGUISTIC POINTERS AND CONCEPTUAL DIRECTIVES
The expression, „Islamic philosophy‟, as it is rendered in the English language, or
in associated European idioms („philosophie islamique‟), refers in its technical
linguistic sense to what is known in the original Arabic language as „falsafa‟. The
term was historically coined in Arabic to adapt to the use of the Greek
designation, „philosophia‟, within classical Islamic intellectual traditions. The
English appellation, „Islamic philosophy‟, would be literally translated back into
the Arabic language as, „al-falsafa al-islāmiyya‟, which points to a relatively
modern usage of this expression in the context of referring to Islamic
philosophical thinking in general terms. Consequently, „al-falsafa al-islāmiyya‟
may broadly refer to thought as it is inspired by Islam, and it would thus surpass
the limits of the more clearly defined historical determination of the philosophical
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legacy in Islam as falsafa per se. Accordingly, „al-falsafa al-islāmiyya‟ would
include, in casual idiomatic usages, Islamic intellectual traditions that are not
purely philosophical, but may be associated also with the Muslim schools of
kalām (dialectical systemic theology) and of ‘irfān (traditional monotheistic
mysticism and gnosis), or even of tasawwuf (Sufism). The term, „falsafa‟, in its
classical and more specific technical sense, refers to a family of traditions in
philosophy per se which gave expression to adapted assimilations, critical
interpretations, and innovative expansions of Greek Peripatetic, Platonist, NeoPlatonist, and Neo-Pythagorean schools of thought within a diverse Muslim
cultural milieu. The appellation „falsafa‟ would have sufficiently designated a
movement in philosophical thinking that is connected with Islam as a religion and
civilization without the need to affirm that it was Islamic (islāmiyya). The
ambivalent use of the designator, „falsafa‟, in relatively modern terms, would
moreover encompass what some mystically-oriented Muslim scholars would take
to be a way of life that rests on meditative spiritual exercises (al-riyādāt alrūhīyya) which aim at perfecting the self (what in Arabic is designated by the term
„al-nafs‟ [literally: „the soul‟]) and refining its faculties in the hope of attaining
wisdom, justice, happiness, and potentially aiming at the disclosure of the ultimate
principles of reality which are taken to be veiled.1 In broad terms, falsafa
generated isomorphic epistemic and ontological systems of thought which
combined Greek legacies in philosophy with dynamic reflections on Abrahamic
monotheism as a revealed religion while placing a particular emphasis on the
multifarious interpretations of the religious teachings of Islam across diverse
confessional expressions and denominations.
2. COMPARATIVE INQUIRIES?
It is perhaps insufficient to establish comparative studies in relation to classical
texts and authors without taking certain precautionary methodological steps,
which can be validated from the viewpoint of historiography, philology,
paleography, and the distinction between traditions along the lines of historical
and cultural differences, with their epistemic and ontological entailments. To
avoid the conventional methodological strictures that are associated with the
investigation of classics, perhaps it is more prudent if comparative inquiries are
initially undertaken with respect to legacies that have well-documented historical
and textual interconnections. In the case of the history of ideas in Islam, the focus
would be directed toward the sequence of civilization and the linguisticconceptual transmission of knowledge from the Greek language into Arabic (at
times via the agency of the Syriac language), and then from Arabic into Latin
(occasionally via the agency of the Hebrew language). This procedure secures a
context for the comparative historical study of texts and their intercultural
adaptations within interlinked intellectual traditions. Accordingly, it would not be
1

In general, mystics in Islam (al-‘urrāf or al-‘ārifūn) focus on meditations, contemplations,
fasting, spiritual exercises (al-riyādāt al-rūhīyya), and ritualistic forms of worship and prayer in
view of connecting with what they consider to be the order of divinity while also aiming at the
disclosure of the principles of reality, which they believe to be veiled (mahjūb) and can only be
unveiled (kashf) via spirituality (rūhānīyyāt), instead of rationalistic deliberation and logical proof.
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controversial if comparative inquiries focus on the reception and response to the
philosophical legacy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) or Ibn Rushd (Averroes) by St.
Thomas Aquinas or the European scholastics. The same can be said about the
investigation of the assimilation of the scientific oeuvre of al-Hasan ibn alHaytham (Alhazen) by thirteenth century Franciscan scholars of optics (like Roger
Bacon or Witelo). Such inquiries are considered acceptable from the standpoint of
textual analysis, historiography, philology, paleography, and the history of science
and philosophy. However, the conceptual and methodological elements become
more complex and ambivalent, or, even doubted by some classicists, historians of
ideas, philologists, or mediaevalists, when the analysis is undertaken from the
viewpoint of contemporary debates in philosophy. This issue becomes further
complicated, and confronted with greater opposition, when falsafa is examined
from the standpoint of contemporary approaches in epistemology, ontology, or
critical theory. This is principally due to the manner in which falsafa is studied in
mainstream modern academia, namely, by being posited as an historical tradition
that is surpassed and disconnected from modern thought. This mode of picturing
falsafa is dominant in scholarship on Islamic philosophy despite its traces still
constituting a living intellectual movement that is practiced, albeit, mimetically or
in reproductive terms, within selected religious Islamic seminaries; this is the case
particularly in Iran, and, up until the beginnings of the twentieth century, in places
like the Azhar academy in Cairo.2 The investigation of falsafa, as an historical
legacy, within the curricula of mainstream European-American academia,
embodies an archaeological bent on studying philosophy in relation to Islam. This
academic penchant regulates the methodology of the guardians of archival
documentation. The historian of ideas studies the intellectual history of Islam in
the spirit of an antiquarian compiler of knowledge who reports the textual
material, and endeavors to document it, in order to primarily serve the
establishment of library references. The aims and objectives of such learned
exegetes and custodians of archiving, differ from the purposes of philosophers per
se, who focus on the evolution of concepts and on the questions of ontology,
epistemology, logic, value theory, etc.
The methodologies of historiography, philology, and paleography, in the
analysis of texts and the archival tracing of their channels of transmission, aim
principally at establishing textual documents. This approach has been historically
shaped by the development of classicist and mediaevalist methods of studying
Greek and Latin texts, ultimately affecting the investigation of Islamic textual
sources, given that most scholars in the academic field of Islamic Studies in
Europe and North America were, until recently, closely connected in pedagogic
and methodological terms with the broader area of Oriental Studies. Scholarship
in Islamic Studies within European and American academia was guided by the
narrow trajectories of Orientalism. While it is historically evident that the
2

The mimetic reproduction of past philosophical traditions in contemporary Muslim religious
circles takes into account some of the pressing lived problems of socio-politics, ethics, and the
applications of the religious law while being based on traditionalist ontological and
epistemological foundations that have not been radically reformed since pre-modern times. One
poignant example that presents itself in this regard is embodied in an implicit presupposition of a
pre-Keplerian cosmology when reflecting on the questions of metaphysics (al-ilāhīyyāt) in relation
to Islam.
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orientalists facilitated the retrieval of non-European intellectual textual legacies,
and also assisted in situating them in their historical and cultural contexts, their
studies were nonetheless generally marked by ideological and colonialist
perspectives that still require corrective reforms in terms of rewriting many
chapters in the history of philosophy and science. After all, the question
concerning the distortive implications of Orientalism in scholarship and culture is
still controversial and remains fervently debated. We are intellectually indebted to
the reflections of Edward Said in this regard who ushered a new critical attitude
toward Oriental Studies, and challenged the unquestioned complacencies in
representing the Orient through the ideological prisms of Orientalism, which
served, until recently, the European colonial material interests (Said, 1978). 3
Besides these aforementioned obstacles, additional difficulties arise due to the
manner by which pre-seventeenth century history of science and philosophy is
generally removed from the central debates in contemporary philosophical
thinking. After all, philosophers feel less restricted studying figures like
Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Kant or Hegel, than they do when dealing with
thinkers from epochs earlier than the seventeenth century or the high Renaissance.
Exceptions do emerge, such as with studies in Neo-Thomism, or the analysis of
Aristotelian doctrines in relation to contemporary questions in the philosophy of
mind, but these remain marginal with regard to the current central topics of
philosophizing per se. Furthermore, while considering the contributions of
philosophers of the Islamic civilization (al-falāsifa) within the mainstream
philosophy department curricula (especially in non-Muslim contexts), these are
usually concealed within the deep folds of mediaeval European thought. Islamic
philosophy is rarely investigated from perspectives that are not strictly confined
within mediaevalist studies. The academic value of the philosophers of Islam is
usually measured in philosophical scales according to how they facilitate the
pedagogic and intellectual understanding of European scholasticism, the
mediaeval interpretation of the Greek corpus in general, and the Aristotelian
tradition in particular.
3. IMPASSES OR HORIZONS?
Studying the impetus of philosophizing in relation to Islam, as a faith and
civilization, from a contemporary standpoint in philosophical thinking remains a
desideratum that points to diverse obstacles, which can be summarized as follows:
1. Historical (since falsafa is principally posited as being mediaeval); 2. Cultural
(by assuming that falsafa is incommensurably oriental); 3. Textual-archival (that
falsafa was transmitted in fragments to the European context and its intellectual
influence within philosophy gradually decreased and disappeared); and 4.
Islamicate (in the sense of resisting [prudently, dogmatically, or politically] what
some Muslim scholars see as being a contamination of the traditionalist Islamic
legacies with unnecessary and alien philosophical constructs that are derived from
American/European sources). These methodological strictures, coupled with the
3

European Orientalism had further prolongations within American discourses on the Orient in
serving US foreign policies; these were also dialectically paralleled by historical materialist
geopolitical approaches to integrating the Muslim communities within the Soviet Union.
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historicist angst regarding anachronism in historiography, can be surpassed
through the careful steps of opening up the horizons of reflection on common
questions in epistemology, ontology, logic, in addition to the assessment of
responses to questions within the fields of philosophy of science, religion, and art.
By way of illustrating the possibilities of such analytics, and in terms of pointing
out some novel pathways for thinking, in spite of the conventional methodological
strictures, the second part of this present paper offers two case-studies that
investigate the potentials of renewing the philosophical engagement with the
history of ideas in Islam. In this sense, I examine the ontology of Ibn Sīnā
(Avicenna; d. 1037 CE) from the standpoint of Heidegger‟s critique of the history
of metaphysics,4 and I reflect on the epistemic dimensions of the theory of vision
of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen; d. ca. 1041 CE) from the viewpoint of MerleauPonty‟s phenomenology of perception.
4. RENEWAL IN PHILOSOPHIZING?
The present course of investigation in this paper aims at finding ways by which
the impetus of philosophizing in relation to the history of ideas in Islam can be
renewed. So, is it indeed possible to develop a new school of falsafa that is
contemporary and retains various forms of epistemic, hermeneutic, and textual
interconnections with intellectual history in Islam? In what ways would it also
contribute to elucidating contemporary mainstream philosophical debates in
relation to science, religion, technology, art, politics, ethics, society and culture?
Just like the early Islamic philosophers and theologians developed their
intellectual traditions in response to their encounters with the Greek corpus, and
by confronting the theoretical and practical challenges of their own epoch, new
forms of falsafa can be shaped in connection with Islam and in direct
philosophical engagements with modernity in its variegated forms. For instance,
investigating Ibn Sīnā‟s ontology, from the standpoint of critically rethinking
Heidegger‟s critique of the history of metaphysics, would not necessarily or
readily result in the development of a novel way of philosophical thinking, as this
initially took place in the case of al-Kindī‟s reading of the Neo-Platonized version
of the Aristotelian corpus that was available to him in the ninth century. 5
Nevertheless, this intellectual exercise might allow for a third pathway in thought
to emerge that would revive some aspects of ontology in the history of ideas in
4

I initiated this specific line of ontological inquiry elsewhere (El-Bizri, 2000). The
phenomenological investigation of selected philosophical traditions in Islam is also supported by a
book-series that I co-edited with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (President, World Phenomenology
Institute, Hanover, New Hampshire) and Gholam-Reza Aavani (Director, Iranian Institute of
Philosophy, Tehran), which is entitled, Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in
Dialogue (a series that is published by Springer [formerly, Kluwer Academic Publishers] in
Dordrecht and Berlin).
5
The transmission and translation of manuscripts that were associated with the Aristotelian
corpus, within the scholarly circles in Islamic civilization in the ninth century, resulted in the
attribution of two texts to Aristotle, which were imbued with Neo-Platonized leitmotifs. The first
text was the so-called Theology of Aristotle (in Arabic: al-Thīyūlūjīyyā), and the second was the
Book of Pure Goodness (in Arabic: Kitāb al-khayr al-mahd; in Latin as: Liber de Causis).
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Islam in a manner that actively engages with reflections on the question of being
in our age and its techno-scientific bearings, while also being situated within the
circles of contemporary philosophical deliberation and thinking. Similarly, an
inquiry about Ibn al-Haytham‟s optics, from the viewpoint of the phenomenology
of perception, can potentially open up new possibilities for reflections in
epistemology, and approach the history of the exact sciences in Islam beyond the
narrow confines of historiography per se.
5. BREAKING THE MOLD?
Current advancements in techno-science, the development of efficient and wide
ranging capacities in telecommunications, and the technical as well as economic
facilitation of travel and study abroad (along with the establishment of various
branches of European and North-American universities in Asia and the Middle
East) entice us to rethink inherited epistemic models of picturing the history of
philosophy and science. The potentials of emancipation and the generation of
novel schools of philosophy in this present century, by way of being inspired by
intercultural intellectual histories, cannot be arrested or compromised in terms of
succumbing to the restrictions imposed by the custodians of archives within the
circles of classicists, mediaevalists, and orientalists. The dominance of
Orientalism and Eurocentric models in understanding and studying Islamic
philosophy is no longer sustainable, even if it is still deeply entrenched in the most
established and oldest institutions of higher-education in Europe and NorthAmerica. Moreover, the construction of knowledge, its dissemination, adaptive
reception, and interpretive assimilation through sequences of civilizations, and in
cultural-political terms that modulate the sociology of philosophical and scientific
knowledge, cannot be all contained by the rules of reportage and documentary
archiving. The intellectual heritage of a people cannot simply be posited as relics
from the past that can only be studied through the narrow channels of academic
expertise in documenting traditions. This is especially the case if such heritage is
still a living source of cultural inspiration for multiple communities, and partly
shapes, in tacit forms, some of their inherited outlooks on the universe concerning
truth, goodness, beauty, justice and governance. This is clearly the case with
respect to the history of philosophical and scientific ideas in Islam which reflects
on socio-cultural dimensions that classicists, mediaevalists, and scholars of
Oriental Studies are unable to fully acknowledge or recognize. This state of affairs
reveals the need to be more directly engaged in critically analyzing these past
legacies from the viewpoint of the potential connection of their fundamental
elements with contemporary concerns in thinking. Greater possibilities are now
available for studying the classics through developments in narrative analysis,
critical theory, post-modernist discourse, the technicalities of epistemology and
logic in the Analytic School in philosophy, along with the unfolding of the
horizons of fundamental ontology, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and
deconstruction. All offer enriching differential potentials for the renewal of
philosophical inquiry, cultural dialogue, and intellectual exchanges across
civilizations. Having stated that, it remains indeed essential to rely at times on
philology, paleographic textual analysis, the critical editing of manuscripts, the
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production of annotated translations, and the establishment of exegetical
commentaries, which are based on sound historiography, all in order to render the
classical sources accessible. Such noble aims may be sufficient from the
viewpoint of establishing the classical material on sound historical and textual
grounds. However, from the perspectives that surpass the limits of these
conventions, what are the epistemic, cognitive, and cultural entailments of the
history of philosophy and science? And how do these inform contemporary
debates in philosophy and their relationships with science, religion, art, politics,
ethics, and culture? Do historical precedents have any implications with respect to
inspiring, informing, or dialectically differing from our contemporary outlooks on
the human condition, the cosmos, divinity, truth, goodness, beauty, and justice?
Can they elucidate our grasp of the evolution of concepts and the taxonomies of
knowledge and its canonization? Finally, what value do they bring to discussions
regarding epistemology, ontology, logic, and value theory? These philosophical
interrogations are customarily set outside the spheres of historiography, philology,
paleography, and the archival documentation in the academic fields of Oriental
and Islamic Studies.
6. PREPARATORY STEPS IN COMPARATIVE INQUIRY
In reflecting on the possibilities of renewing the impetus of philosophizing in
relation to Islam, and thus in rekindling the potential reanimation of falsafa in
contemporary terms, a measured prudence ought to be exercised. One‟s own voice
as interpreter ought to be clearly distinguished from that of the original author of a
historical text in order to show with lucidity where deviations and new
propositions are presented, which belong to the spheres of critical analytics and
hermeneutics, instead of being part of the textually-oriented practice of exegesis
and documentation. This state of affairs doubles the interpretive activity to ensure
that the classical text is soundly situated in its appropriate context in terms of its
documented interconnections with other constellations of texts and pathways of
transmission across languages and intellectual traditions. This activity can be
intertwined with analyses that lift some of the old propositions from their
narrowly determined historical spheres, by way of assessing their potencies in
generating renewed and innovative horizons for philosophical thinking. Such
matters do not fall squarely within the professional academic domain of the
career-oriented study of philosophy and its history, especially in relation to Islam.
However, many scholars, academics, and philosophers find themselves personally
torn between contemporary philosophy from one side (with its various branches,
quarrels, and most prominent Analytic-Continental bifurcation) and the
attractiveness of other intellectual traditions that do not belong to modern
American-European philosophy. Hence, they find themselves situated in a region
between philosophy per se (narrowly labeled as „Western‟ or „Occidental‟) and
the intellectual heritage of non-European civilizations (Chinese, Indian, Islamic).
The biographical and intimately personal becomes intricately interwoven with the
conceptual and academic, in such a way that areas of specialization and
concentration result in sets of publications and communications that address topics
that seem to be incommensurable or incompatible. Philosophers who find
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themselves in such circumstances seem to deal with antinomies while mediating
multiple intellectual loyalties. The individual scholar would have to modify
themes, methodologies, and procedures of disseminating research in view of
serving narrowly delimited spheres of study, which separate contemporary
philosophy from the historical depositories of wisdom and knowledge in nonEuropean traditions. It therefore becomes an urgent call for thinking about this
question by those who find themselves trapped in this gap between traditions. It is
this space, as the liminal region of the in-between, that we are driven more
pressingly to occupy within this current century. We therefore start with
conversations, dialogues, exchanges at the margins, and through comparative
studies. Eventually, the intensification of such intellectual activities may result in
works of synthesis, isomorphic unification, and the merging of horizons which
offer novel possibilities for thought and the renewal of philosophy. In this process,
many thinkers will continue to adjust their intellective persona depending on
academic readership and scholarly audience, along the lines of dividing
disciplines and oscillations over fissures in their philosophical thought, while
proceeding by way of leaps from one intellectual tradition to another.
7. FALSAFA IN THIS CURRENT CENTURY?
It is unclear whether the investigation of philosophy, in the shadows of the field of
Islamic Studies, and under the specter of Oriental Studies, connects with
contemporary philosophy beyond the domains of comparative analysis. Would
falsafa emerge in novel forms in our current century, which render it a relevant
school of contemporary thought? The implications of this question can extend
further in terms of renewing the Chinese or Indian philosophical tradition in
response to contemporary philosophy, modernity, techno-science, and the
organization of the models of modern episteme and material culture. Yet, the
question concerning falsafa remains at this stage more intimately connected with
the standpoint of those inspired by the history of ideas in Islam and those who
partake in contemporary debates in philosophy.
This set of philosophical interrogations on methods of inquiry that we have
traversed so far is meant to act as a prolegomenon to future reflections on this
matter, while building on previous attempts to address this question in the
endeavor to rekindle the possibilities it may offer in its potential unfolding. Such
aspirations have been situated hitherto at the margins of the academic procedures
that separate Islamic Studies from philosophy per se within the university
curriculum, due to the pedagogical and methodological directives that are
professionally controlled by influential authoritative peers in academia. These
concrete aspects of academic life, the cultivation of scholarship, the destining of
individual apprentices on career-paths, and the educational shaping of the
formative constitution and aggregation of young academics, all point to the actual
practicalities of specializing in Islamic philosophy. To gain proper grounding, it is
not sufficient to study in a philosophy department, particularly for those who are
not native speakers (or have the linguistic competence of native speakers) of the
Arabic language (namely, the lingua franca of classical Islamic civilization), or of
the Persian or Turkish language (with emphasis on Ottoman, which is not a lived
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and practiced linguistic tradition anymore). Besides the need to acquire a solid, or
at least, a good working-knowledge of Arabic and/or Persian (or in some cases, of
Ottoman Turkish), the research student at advanced graduate studies must also
have a firm grounding in the history of ideas in Islam. This curriculum of
language, history, and culture is shaped by Middle Eastern Departments and
Faculties of Oriental Studies. Added to this is the historical aspect of falsafa as it
is principally studied in mainstream academia. This would thus further require
grounding in historiography, philology, paleographic textual analysis, and the
assessment of manuscripts, along with a specific bent on conducting research
through tedious biographical-bibliographical instruments, which rely heavily on
annotations, and on reporting relegated narratives, anecdotes, and chronicles of
past historians, travelers, commentators, copyists of codices, compilers of
compendia, glossators and scholiasts. Having passed through these academic
curricula, the research student, or doctoral candidate, who desires specializing in
Islamic philosophy, would have been already cultivated as a scholar of Islamic
Studies and not as a philosopher per se. Those who are able to retain their interest
in contemporary philosophy would then either do it at the margins of their work in
Islamic Studies, or they would be affiliated with philosophy departments that offer
courses on Islamic philosophy, without conducting the most advanced forms of
closely studying texts in their original language. Consequently, students become
commentators on the primary sources through the agency of secondary or tertiary
literature, and they acquire the reputation of being non-experts in the field as their
work is assessed by the established scholars in the field of Islamic Studies. The
gap widens with time and career progression, and the opportunities to oscillate
between disciplines become narrower and riskier. Hence, a movement from
contemporary philosophy toward Islamic Studies in investigating falsafa (or
moving the other way round) all appear again as a series of leaps. The picture
becomes furthermore unhandsome when Ancient Greek and, at times, Latin, are
posited as additional linguistic requirements in the formation of scholars who
endeavor to study falsafa, especially when their prospective inquiries are expected
to be conducted in a restricted domain of comparativeness from the viewpoint of
mediaevalist research that focuses on the documented transmission of knowledge
from Greek into Arabic and Arabic into Latin.
8. THE BARRIERS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Besides the obstacles that result from the methods of historiography, philology,
and paleography (in the domains of Oriental and Islamic Studies), the divisions
within contemporary philosophy enact additional epistemic and conceptual
barriers in the face of comparative research. Engagement with the history of
philosophy from a contemporary standpoint is principally conducted within the
so-called „Continental School‟ in terms of the manner in which it mediates some
of its central investigations regarding its critical reinterpretation of the history of
philosophical and scientific ideas. Numerous controversies arise within this
contemporary movement in philosophizing. For instance, a focus on Heidegger‟s
critique of the history of metaphysics, which is undertaken against the horizon of
the unfolding of science and the essence of technology, is itself burdened by
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quarrels within the field of Heideggerian Studies and its reception by philosophers
from other intellectual traditions: disputes arise over the interpretation of
technical, Heideggerian terms, or with regard to the determination of the course of
the development of Heidegger‟s thought, or the translation of Heidegger‟s edited
German texts into English, French or Italian. Additional polemics emerge in
terms of the political shadows that are recast in recurrent patterns over
Heidegger‟s biography, or by way of the diverse forms of opposition that his
thought continues to face from the Husserlian phenomenologists and the Analytic
philosophers, along with controversies that arise in terms of reading his works
through the writings of J.P. Sartre, J. Beaufret, J. Derrida, and E. Levinas.
These multiple barriers become higher and frequently established when we
consider the interpretation of the history of philosophy through Heideggerian
perspectives.
Classicists, mediaevalists, phenomenologists, and analytic
philosophers all raise various differential doubts regarding such undertakings. The
entirety of such polemics become hypercritical when an attempt is made in
interpreting the ontology of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) from the standpoint of
Heidegger‟s critique of the history of metaphysics despite the fact that
Avicennism (al-Sīnawīyya)6 belongs to the history of European thought, at least in
its Latinate scholasticism, along with the implicit impact it had on foundational
figures in modern philosophy, such as Kant and Hegel. The conceptual
circumstances are perhaps less harsh when focusing on the oeuvre of MerleauPonty. Nonetheless, reading the history of science from a phenomenological
viewpoint is not without its epistemic and methodological obstacles. These take
more severe expressions when the inquiry focuses on the scientific legacies of
brilliant polymaths like Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), in spite of his direct influence
on the history of science in Europe, and even on architectural and artistic practices
within the perspectivae traditions from the twelfth century until the period of the
high Renaissance (El-Bizri, 2009, 2010; Kemp, 1978, pp. 134-61; 1984, 1989;
Lindberg, 1971, pp. 66-83; 1997, pp. 355-68). Albeit, one can still resort to
elegant combinations of epistemology and the history of science in terms of
conducting this line of analysis based on the deployed methods akin to historians
like A. Koyré, and more probingly, by thinkers like G. Bachellard, in view of
bridging the gap between historical epistemology and the philosophy of science.

PART II
9. CASE-STUDIES
How can we account for what is named by the appellation „falsafa‟ in
contemplation of the locked and suspended philosophical possibilities that remain
concealed within the labyrinthine folds of its arrested intellectual histories? We
reflect in this sense on the horizons of the renewal of the impetus of philosophical
thinking in relation to the history of ideas in Islam, which surpass the limitations
of academic assignments, in view of genuinely desiring the unfolding of original
6

Avicennism (al-Sīnawīyya) constitutes the legacy of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) in philosophy and
science.
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thought that is re-collective, de-structuring, and re-constructive in its modes of
revealing the gravity of critically rethinking the inherited conventional
methodologies.
In view of this thought-provoking call for thinking, we may tangentially
appeal to foundational, classical traditions that had a deep impact on
philosophizing in Islam, and exercised a profound influence on European
scholarship in both the mediaeval and Renaissance epoch. For the sake of
undertaking pathways that may inspire this endeavor, we will now turn to the
scenes of instruction within the legacies of two groundbreaking eleventh century
polymaths: Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen). Both luminaries
offer pointers and directives that may partly assist us in reformulating some of the
essential classical questions in ontology and epistemology, respectively in relation
to reflections on the questions of being and perception. This line of inquiry
presents us with selected philosophical pathways amongst many, which may
potentially facilitate the founding of new modes of rethinking falsafa, as it is
inspired by the intellectual history in Islam, and in a manner that is oriented by
lived aspirations in the unfurling of original thinking.
10. IBN SĪNĀ‟S ONTOLOGY
Turning our gaze toward the ontological question concerning being, we reflect on
Ibn Sīnā‟s philosophical legacy that offers us a concretized intellectual context to
investigate the impetus of metaphysics in the history of ideas in Islam. Ibn Sīnā‟s
ontology constituted one of the most influential legacies of falsafa in the
intellectual history of Islamic civilization. This foundational tradition presents us
with fundamental ontological notions that can be effectively assessed through
dialectical and critical engagements with Heidegger‟s thought. The focus on Ibn
Sīnā‟s ontology may also assist us in initiating a potentially critical dialogue
revolving around Heideggerian notions that interrogated the rudiments of classical
metaphysical thinking.
Ibn Sīnā‟s thinking not only had an impact on Thomism and Scotism, but was
also widely assimilated within European mediaeval and Renaissance scholarship.
Any philosophical inquiry about the continuance of classical Greek traditions in
philosophy within mediaeval schools cannot be complete and probingly thorough
unless it takes into account the transmitted contributions of the principal
philosophers of mediaeval Islamic civilization in general, and of Avicennism in
particular. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that inquiries about
Heidegger‟s critique of the history of metaphysics in reference to mediaeval
philosophical doctrines would be incomplete if the principal conceptual bearings
of Avicennism are not also critically examined, or if the prolongations of this
longstanding tradition in classical ontology are not adequately investigated. Ibn
Sīnā‟s legacy has its own European history, even if it is still considered by some
philosophers, historians or theologians (principally in a non-Muslim milieu) as
being the tradition of “the (oriental-Muslim) other” that has been veiled within
that history. Ibn Sīnā‟s metaphysics belongs to the history of classical ontology
that has been interrogated by Heidegger, even though Avicennism was not
explicitly examined in detail within the Heideggerian legacy.
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I do not imply in this context that Heidegger was not aware of the assimilation
of Ibn Sīnā‟s tradition within the European Latin scholarly circles. However, he
might not have fully acknowledged the extent of the influence that has been
exercised by Avicennism in that intellectual historical-cultural milieu. It might
have been the case that Heidegger implicitly assumed that the entailments of Ibn
Sīnā‟s metaphysics unquestionably belong to classical ontology, or he did not
believe that Avicennism was integral to what he grasped as being the history of
(Western) metaphysics.
The effort in reflecting on the fundamental notions of Ibn Sīnā‟s ontology,
from the standpoint of critically thinking about the entailments of Heidegger‟s
critique of the history of metaphysics, constitutes an ontological inquiry that is
akin, in many aspects, to Heideggerian investigations that have been conducted on
classical ontology, including studies on mediaeval European scholars of the
caliber of St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Francisco Suárez, or Meister
Eckhart. Such ontological inquiry would be principally focused on Ibn Sīnā‟s
account of being (al-wujūd) in terms of contingency (al-imkān) and necessity (alwujūb), and in relation to the question concerning the distinction and connection
between essence (quiddity; al-māhiyya) and existence (al-wujūd). Additional
ontological aspects of Ibn Sīnā‟s philosophy relate to his epistemology and his
conception of the soul (al-nafs) and its cognitive faculties (El-Bizri, 2003), along
with reflections on the logical, etymological and linguistic properties of his
metaphysical thinking; this includes the consideration of the innovative
conceptual elements in his metaphysics that surpassed many of the notions that
were associated with the Aristotelian and Platonist traditions (El-Bizri, 2001,
2006a, 2008a). Taking this into account, the conceptual elements that may be
derived from Heideggerian perspectives on scholasticism may well assist us
dialectically in investigating the extent of the applicability of Heidegger‟s critique
of metaphysics across a variety of classical ontological traditions (including
Avicennism), while furthermore opening up pathways to rethinking some of the
principal notions of Ibn Sīnā‟s ontology in terms of relevant contemporary topics
of philosophical debate. However, one must proceed in this context with caution
given that our grasp of both thinkers (Ibn Sīnā, and Heidegger) is still faced with
epistemic and doctrinal difficulties, in addition to variegated querelles d’écoles
that surround their legacies.
From a Heideggerian viewpoint, philosophy is in essence an inquiry into being
(Die Philosophie ist das Fragen nach dem Sein), and a reflection about the
withdrawal of the meaning, truth and place of being (Sein) from thought. Thinking
finds its possibilities in displacing the histories of thought, and the epochs that
were grounded on them, in the great comings and goings of the foundational
seasons in philosophy. The history of metaphysics and classical ontology is said to
be a history of the oblivion of the ontological difference between being and beings
and its abandonment in thought, which is closely connected to the unfolding of the
essence of technology that is not strictly technological, but is essentially a mode of
en-framing (Ge-Stell) beings in their being, and positing them as standing-reserve
(Bestand). This forgetfulness of being is a mark of the self-persecuting character
of the beingness of Dasein, namely, as that being who inquires about its being-inthe-world, and lets being reveal itself (Dasein conceived herein as: être-là, or être-
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le-là; Beaufret, 1985; El-Bizri, 2006b, 2006c). The history of philosophy is seen
from this perspective as a grand drama of decline despite the heights of our
technological age, which in its powerful rationalities, stands at what some picture
as being the limits of the closure of metaphysics, its last frontiers, as the end of
philosophy!
Heidegger reflected on the question of being (Seinsfrage) in his investigation
of the basic problems of phenomenology in the summer lecture course of 1927 in
Marburg (not published until 1975), which complemented the thesis of his major
opus, Sein und Zeit (published in 1927, yet completed in 1926). Heidegger partly
mediated the development of his own fundamental ontology by way of analyzing
some of the principal theses of scholasticism regarding the constitution of the
being of a being in relation to the classical controversy over the distinction and
connection between essentia and existentia. It is well documented in his
meditations on this question (in Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie) that the
initial conceptual foundations of this ontological tradition were laid down by
Avicenna [Ibn Sīnā] (Heidegger, 1975, p. 113).
The focus on Ibn Sīnā‟s ontology can well be mediated by the manner he
addresses the question of being (mas’alat al-wujūd) and the reflection on the
internal dialectics that modulate his conception of the ontological bearings of the
modalities of necessity and contingency with regard to the relationships between
essence and existence, and the determination of the ontological difference
between beings and the being of beings. This is the case even though the
distinction between essence and existence is hinted at with ambivalence in the
Aristotelian tradition in terms of thinking about what is intended from the saying,
„tode ti‟ (the „thisness‟ of a present extant thing, or what in Scotism is designated
in Latin as, „haecceitas‟, namely, „singularity in identity‟), in contrast with the
vague and hard to apprehend expression, „to ti ēn einai‟ („what it was for
something to be the thing it is‟). And yet, what is aimed at by these utterances,
along with the Aristotelian categories, all refer back to the sustaining and leading
fundamental meaning of „ousia‟ („substance‟), which is always said alongside the
various meanings of „being‟ (Metaphysics, Books Theta and Zeta; Aristotle,
1924). Consequently, the ontological question concerning the meaning of being
becomes a metaphysical interrogation about the notion of substance.
Heidegger suggests furthermore that Ibn Sīnā‟s distinction between essence
and existence underlies the Kantian thesis about being (Kritik der reinen Vernunft:
Critique of Pure Reason; Kant, 1929, A598-B626):
Being is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of
something which could be added to the concept of a thing; it is
merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations as
existing in-themselves. Logically, it is the copula of a judgment.

This thesis is noted in the context of speculating about the impossibility of
having an ontological proof in terms of reflecting on the transcendental dialectical
inferences of pure reason. Based on this, realitas meant essentia and it constituted
an ontological problem besides the metaphysical reflections on the meaning of
essentia/subtantia. So, how does „reality‟ and „existence‟belong to a being, let
alone their ontological interconnection defined? Moreover, how can the
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distinction between essence and existence be interpreted in terms of the
ontological difference between beings and being? According to Heidegger, the
distinction between essentia and existentia does not correspond with the
ontological difference between beings and being. Rather, it belongs to one side or
the other of this binary bifurcation, namely, by positing primordial essence as an
opposite counterpart of primordial existence. 7
The problem of the distinctio and compositio between the essentia of a being
and its existentia lies at the roots of the Kantian thesis about being (Heidegger,
1975, pp. 109-110). This can be articulated in terms of the following scholastic
disjunctive binaries: ens infinitum vs. ens finitum; ens increatum vs. ens creatum;
ens necessarium vs. ens contingens; ens per essentiam vs. ens per
participationem; actus purus vs. ens potentiale; ens a se vs. ens ab alio; etc.8 The
ens perfectissimum is: ens a se, ens infinitum, ens increatum, ens necessarium, ens
per essentiam, actus purus. These notions offer Latin renditions of what Ibn Sīnā
noted with regard to wājib al-wujūd bi-dhātihi and wājib al-wujūd bi-ghayrihi,
namely, by respectively differentiating (in ontological terms): Necessary-Beingdue-to-Its-Self from necessary-being-due-to-something-other-than-itself qua
contingent-being-in-itself (Ibn Sīnā, 1874, pp. 262-3; 1960, p. 65; 1975, pp. 36-9,
43-7, 350-5; 1985, pp. 255, 261-5, 272-5, 283-5; El-Bizri, 2006a, 2008a).
Necessary-Being-due-to-Its-Self is without quiddity and definition or description,
and Its essence is being. The Necessary Existent due to Its-Self as Necessary
Being qua Necessary Existence/Existing is Pure Being. All that can be uttered
about Necessary Being is „il y a‟ (Levinas, 1979, pp. 24-30),9 „es gibt sein‟, „there
is‟, „hunālika‟…„huwa‟...
There is a manifold of dialectical dynamics that surround the meditations on
wājib al-wujūd per se: The Necessary-Existent is a determinate onto-theological
being or existent that moves from pure being to determinateness in being. To
evoke a Hegelian parlance we would say that pure being is sublated into
determinate being, moving from being-itself to being-within-itself as being-foritself and being-for-other. This describes the double movement of emanating
otherness from sameness and then re-attracting otherness to sameness. Despite
investigating being qua being, an onto-theological turn is already attested with
Aristotle‟s conception of metaphysics as theology, albeit, a new foundational
phase in metaphysical thinking arises with the way Ibn Sīnā systemically
conferred autonomy to ontology from the determinants of theology in reflecting
on the question of being.
Ibn Sīnā‟s reflections on the relationship between essence and existence, based
on the context of his account of the question of being, in terms of the modalities of
necessity and contingency, found its highest consummation in Hegel‟s
essentialism in the logical unfolding of Begriff (Wissenschaft der Logik; Hegel,
7

In the Islamic context, and in the historical reinterpretations of Ibn Sīnā‟s metaphysics,
Suhrawardī (fl. 12th cent.) argued in favor of the primacy of essence over existence, while Mullā
Sadrā (fl. 17th cent.) affirmed the primacy of existence over essence.
8
The distinction between essence and existence, founded ontologically by Ibn Sīnā, becomes: a
distinctio realis in Thomism; a distinctio formalis or modalis in Scotism; and a distinctio rationis
with Suárez.
9
We reflect here on the onto-theological implications of Levinas‟ critical response to Heidegger in
terms of thinking about the hypostasis of l’exister sans existant (existing without existent).
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1969)10 and prior to the associated Kantian thesis that being is not a real
predicate, as Heidegger proclaimed (Heidegger, 1975). The matter to be thought
is how being is the indeterminate immediate universal that is the most abstract and
simple self-evidence in presencing? This echoes the Kantian proposition that
perception is the sole character of actuality, as Kant held in the context of
assessing the postulates of empirical thought in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(Critique of Pure Reason; Kant, 1929, A225-B273). Perception corresponds in
this context to the disclosure of extant beings in perceptual acts. Hence, extant
actual existents are perceived beings which are uncovered and disclosed in
apperception through the inner-worldly phenomenal fields of perception.
11. TRANSITION
An insight into the line of thinking that may have also converged seeing with
knowing can be detected in comparative terms by contemplating the meaning that
is aimed at in the first proposition that opens Aristotle‟s Metaphysics, namely,
“pantes anthrōpoi tou eidenai oregontai phusei” (Metaphysics; Aristotle, 1924, A,
980a 21). This line is customarily translated as, “All humans by nature desire to
know”. However, here is an alternative polemical reading proposed by Heidegger:
“Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens” (“The care for
seeing is essential to the being of the human being”; Heidegger, 1953, section 36).
Herein, eidenai (to know, to see) is understood as being linked to eidos (outward
appearance, look) insofar that the latter is construed as being the visible form of
something. Knowing is transmuted into an act of seeing, whereby horan (sight)
brings about knowledge of things more efficiently than all the other senses, and is
hence irreducible to, the order of mere sense perception. The correspondence
between knowledge and vision is perhaps attested in the manner in which Plato
reinforced the cognitive character of theōria over that of epistēmē, whereby vision
shows rather than tells. In addition, and as noted by Aristotle, horan highlights the
differences between things (Metaphysics; Aristotle, 1924, A, 980a 25). Hence, it
may be seen as being akin to the etymological root of the word, „theōria‟,
whereby the Greek terms „thea‟ („spectacle‟) and „horaō‟ („to see‟, „to look‟) are
brought together to determine the expression, „theōria‟, which names a concept
that refers to the act of seeing a spectacle, or looking at a view (McNeill, 1999, p.
174); the care for seeing intersects with the desire to know. Both find their roots in
curiosity and in the modern advent of Die Zeit des Weltbildes (The time of the
world-picture, or the apprehension of the world as a picture), wherein theōria
becomes a representational mode of seeing with the human subject turning into
the grounding Archimedean vantage point (McNeill, 1999, p. 221). This mode of
addressing the question of being pulls thought toward reflections on the
ontological determinants of perception.
12. IBN AL-HAYTHAM‟S PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

10

In Hegelian essentialism, being is simply the becoming of essence, while the becoming of being
is a transition from being to essence.
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Although numerous studies have been conducted on the Optics (in Arabic: Kitāb
al-manāzir; in Latin: De Aspectibus or Perspectivae) of al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham
(Alhazen, d. ca. 1041 CE; Ibn al-Haytham, 1972, 1983, 1989, 2001, 2002), and on
its reception, assimilation and maturation within the perspectivae traditions in the
history of science and art (Kemp, 1978, pp. 134-61; 1984, 1989; Lindberg, 1971,
pp. 66-83; 1997, pp. 355-68), ambiguities still do hitherto surround the
epistemological and ontological entailments of his theory of visual perception (ElBizri, 2005). Ibn al-Haytham‟s thinking speaks to us in an effective manner that is
relevant in its attuned bearings to the thrust of phenomenological theories of
perception, and their connection with the fundamental questions of ontology and
epistemology.
Ibn al-Haytham offered an experiential analysis of how the manifestation of a
thing in its plenitude through its visible aspects, which are detected in a continuum
of manifold appearances, occurs by way of contemplation and bodily spatialtemporal displacement. Vision manifests the fullness of the volumetric massing of
a thing as a constituted unified structure through the partial givenness of its
apparent aspects in successions of continuous perceptions. This state of affair is
illustrated by way of multiple perspectives, such that a thing is never seen in its
entirety instantaneously and immediately, since the appearance of some of its
sides entail that its remaining aspects are unseen. Hence, a partial disclosure of an
opaque object in vision is always associated with the concealment of some of its
surfaces. In visual perception, a visible object that is given through direct vision
and immediate intuition reveals some of its surfaces or sides while its remaining
aspects are veiled. A distinction is posited here between authentic qua proper
appearances, namely, those which relate to a concrete act of seeing where the
sides of the visible object are perceived in immediate intuition and direct vision,
and inauthentic qua imagined appearances, namely, those which designate the
imaginary surplus that accompanies the authentic appearances in the constitutive
perception of the object of vision in its imagined totality. So, the full silhouette of
a thing is constituted by its spatial-temporal bodily displacement 11 and the
essential unity between its authentic and inauthentic appearances. Hence,
perspective is essentially a phenomenon of the mystery of spatial depth, which
demarcates my situation in the world as being distinct from other perceivers, yet,
it is also through spatial depth and temporal horizons that my relations with other
perceivers and things are opened up.
The object of vision appears as a constant presence despite its optical
variations in natural perspective and immediate intuition. Seeing does partly let
things self-show themselves as they are, for what appears in the spectacle is led
back to an order of familiarity, and, as Ibn al-Haytham showed, seeing is a mode
of recognition, discernment, and comparative measure (al-ma’rifa wa-al-tamyīz
wa-al-qiyās)12 that allows what appears to self-show itself as it is given in its own
11

This refers to the movement of the perceiver around the object of vision and/or the movement of
the object of vision itself in such a way that its sides are revealed in succession to the observer.
12
Ibn al-Haytham offered a physiological-neurological-psychological analysis of visual perception
that went beyond the geometrical-physical explication in optics of the introduction of light rays
into the eyes. Based on Ibn al-Haytham‟s experimental explanations (which rested on
mathematics, physics, anatomy, and a series of experiential tests), only light qua light and color
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apparition in presencing. However, the semblance of constancy in presence is not
guaranteed after the lapsing of a considerable period of time, given that things are
subject to becoming and change (al-taghayyur).
Space-time, depth and place, as well as the corporeal engagement of the
observer within the spectacle, all ground perception and its veridical potentials. It
is through movement that the partial self-givenness of the formal reality of what is
seen is affirmed in its wholeness. Perceptual acts are affirmed and corrected by
other complementary verifying perceptions, whereby judgments resulting from
certain errors in vision get rectified by way of additional verified data that rest on
the acuity and sensitivity of vision itself, rather than doing away with the
epistemic possibilities that this powerful perceptual capacity offers to cognition. 13
Investigating the veridical conditions of vision in the science of optics was pivotal
in Ibn al-Haytham‟s endeavor to mathematize the notions of physics (El-Bizri,
2007a, 2008c), and to establish the foundations of scientific experimentation (ali’tibār) and controlled testing, as they were grounded on the accurate registering
of repeated observational data and geometrical modeling in determining the
procedures of verification, demonstration, and proof. The precision of Ibn alHaytham‟s experiments was remarkable to the level that most of his tests, with
their corresponding scientific instruments and designed experimental installations,
were accurately reconstructed and reenacted about three centuries later by Kamāl
al-Dīn al-Fārisī, as described in the latter‟s Tanqīh al-manāzir (The Recension of
[Ibn al-Haytham’s] Optics), and resulted in the reconfirmation of most of Ibn alHaytham‟s observations and data (al-Fārisī, 1928).
Following phenomenological directives, we note that something lets itself be
brought to light or brightness in its appearing, and self-shows itself from itself, in
that very condition of being lit and visible to a presencing observer. This event
describes the unfurling of what may be referred to in Greek as, “apophainesthai ta
phainomena”, namely, “what shows itself from itself, just as it shows itself from
itself”. It is ultimately a translation of the maxim that animates phenomenology:
“zu den Sachen selbst” (“to the things themselves”). And phenomenology is
conceived here as being a fundamental ontology (Fundamentalontologie) that
elucidates the question of being (Seinsfrage) by way of a hermeneutic and eidetic
reflection on what is pointed out by the appellations, „phainō‟, (bringing beings to
light or brightness), „phainesthai‟ (showing itself from itself), and „phainomenon‟
(what self-shows itself from itself). In other words, a phenomenon becomes
qua color constitute pure sensations, while seeing (vision) consists ultimately of complex
physiological-neurological-psychological processes (El-Bizri, 2005; 2009).
13
It is perhaps the case that the stationary gaze of Descartes on objects of vision might have led
him to distrust the veridical conditions of sense perception as delineated in his Meditationes de
Prima Philosophiae [Meditation on First Philosophy] (Descartes, 1993). It is worth stating herein
that Ibn al-Haytham‟s account of the normal conditions of sight involve the following parameters:
1- The viewed object must be bright; 2- the distance between the object and the eye should be
optimal (not too close and not too far); 3- the object should be in a plane with the eye; 4- the body
of the object should have a proper volume; 5- if the body is transparent it should still allow for the
trapping of some light rays; 6- a completely transparent body that does not trap any light rays is
virtually invisible; 7- the distance between the viewer and the object of vision should comprise a
transparent space; 8- the viewer should have sufficient time to view the object of vision; 9- the eye
should be healthy; 10- the eye should be able to concentrate on the object vision (Ibn al-Haytham,
1983 and 1989, sections I.2 [1-26], I.8 [1-11]; El-Bizri, 2005).
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indicative of itself, and already presupposes a perceiver, whereby appearance does
not conceal the essence of a thing as much as it reveals it in presencing, if not
even by letting essence become self-shown as an apparition (Heidegger, 1953,
section 7; Sartre, 1943, pp. 11-6).
The thrust of Ibn al-Haytham‟s theory of visual perception implicitly points to
the possibilities of grasping optics, not merely as a scientific discipline that
inquires about the conditions of sight and light in terms of an epistemology of
photosensitive surfaces, but more as an eidetic inquiry about the constitution of
forms in their essential ordering of geometric structures that is grounded on
experiential and experimental verifications.
Vision is a mode of de-distancing that brings things that are not at hand nearer
from their remoteness, and renders beings accessible even from afar. Linear
perspective (perspectivae artificialis), and its pictorial order, does demarcate a
distance between the eye of the observer and the objects of vision. Nonetheless, it
de-distances beings in sight by assimilating the spectacle in the form of a picture.
However, the distances or intervals that are cleared by vision, and accordingly
brought into nearness in de-distancing, are not objective or measurable as such.
Rather, they are existentially estimated in the very circumspect act of seeing as a
spatial mode of encountering beings in de-distancing. In this context, Ibn alHaytham affirmed experimentally the visibility of spatial depth (Kitāb al-manāzir,
II.3 [67-126]; Ibn al-Haytham, 1983, 1989) in contrast with the eighteenth century
immaterialist thesis of Berkeley. 14 After all, Berkeley believed that the distance
from the eye to a given object of vision, as spatial depth, cannot be immediately
perceived, but only suggested by mental cues offered to vision. Berkeley argued
that sight does not show or in any way inform us that the visual object, which we
immediately perceive, exists at a distance, given that objects produce twodimensional projections on the retina. As a consequence, there cannot be an
immediate vision of space or three-dimensionality. Furthermore, spatial depth
cannot be perceived, but is simply experienced, and so is the case with the
estimation of the size of objects at a remote distance. Relying on the convergence
of the eyes in judging the cues of the apparent size of a visible object, Berkeley,
following the classical mathematicians (mainly Euclidean and Ptolemaic) who
were critically interrogated by Ibn al-Haytham on this question, evokes the angle
of vision as the principal estimative determinant.
The philosophical thrust of the affirmation of the visibility of depth by Ibn alHaytham is best elucidated in Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenological analysis of the
perception of space (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 294-309; El-Bizri, 2004). Based on
our experiential situation in the world, we are not granted the simultaneous
immediacy of seeing depth from our perspective, as well as seeing it in profile
from the position of a viewer who looks at it laterally. However, this does not
readily reduce the primacy of depth (profondeur) into simply being a dimension
like breadth (largeur), given that depth is the most existential of all the
dimensions, since it intrinsically belongs to our personal perspective that offers a
14

Refer to Berkeley‟s views in: sections 2-28, 41-51 of An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
(1709); sections 43-44 of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); the
first dialogue in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), along with remarks in The
Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained (1733); (Berkeley, 1948-1957; 1965).
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self-openness to the world and onto an inter-subjective worldly otherness. Being
the ground of our perspective on things, depth furnishes us with a space of
openness to communicate with others by way of merging the horizons of our
fields of vision and sensory perception, along with the associated exchange of
signifiers that rest on this lived inter-subjective experience of our being-in-theworld (In-der-Welt-sein; être-dans-le-monde). Depth is ultimately the dimension
by which things appear as enveloping one another rather than being juxtaposed.
Unlike mathematical representations, depth highlights the manner in which reality
impinges on and confronts us with a sense of mystery in its eventful presentations
that call for thinking about the place of being, truth and meaning.
Based on this introductory inquiry, and upon other complementary studies that
were highlighted in the accompanying annotations, it is hoped that novel pathways
for rethinking Islamic intellectual history, from the standpoint of contemporary
philosophical debates, can indeed be undertaken in view of renewing the impetus
of philosophizing in relation to Islam.
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